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Introduction 
 
 
The Crushing of Syria’s Civil Actors 
Survival of Grassroots Structures is Crucial for Country’s Future 
Petra Becker and Friederike Stolleis 
The Syrian regime’s strategy of using sieges and bombardments to force rebel-held 
areas to surrender is bringing it closer to its goal of eliminating independent civil-
society engagement and alternative governance structures. Over the past six years, civil 
structures – that is, non-state non-military organisations and institutions – have been 
established and consolidated across Syria in areas out of government control to orga-
nise local affairs and provide the most essential community services. With the inter-
national debate on Syria concentrating on local military developments and regional 
power struggles, Syria’s civil actors have been shifted out of focus. However, the margi-
nalisation of these local and decentralised actors and structures represents a major 
risk for Syria’s future. They not only constitute the bedrock for implementing any 
potential political agreement on the ground, they are also crucial for providing Syrians 
with an alternative to so-called Islamic State (IS) and other Islamist groups, which can-
not be fought successfully by military means alone. 
 
From the beginning of the uprising in 2011, 
civil engagement has been the backbone of 
efforts across Syria to build a free and dem-
ocratic society after forty years of authori-
tarian Ba’ath party rule. Civil actors, in-
creasingly under attack by both the Syrian 
regime and later IS, have shown an extra-
ordinary resilience and adaptability. Clear-
ly, the increasingly militarised context and 
destruction of rebel-held areas as well as 
the strategy deployed by the regime and 
some armed groups of besieging and 
starving populations limit the scope of 
civil activities. Nevertheless, after close to 
six years of conflict, civil actors continue 
their efforts to create alternatives to the 
authoritarian practices of both the regime 
and radical Islamist groups. 
The Awakening of Civil Society 
The emergence of a great variety of grass-
roots initiatives was a direct outcome of 
the 2011 uprising. In the four preceding 
decades of Assad family rule, practically all 
forms of civil engagement had been severely 
restricted. The few non-governmental orga-
nisations active in this period were subject 
to strict government control. 
In 2011, predominantly young men and 
women of diverse class and religious back-
grounds began to gather spontaneously and 
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engage in acts of civil disobedience. These 
activists quickly set up a network of Local 
Coordination Committees (LCCs) which 
organised demonstrations, managed public 
relations, built up contact networks and 
raised funds. The first of these committees 
was created in the Daraya suburb of Damas-
cus. As of February 2012, 14 LCCs existed 
in cities and towns across the country. In 
parallel, informal news agencies emerged, 
allowing self-appointed citizen journalists 
to make their information available to the 
world. Grassroots initiatives emerged in 
civic education, which held secret work-
shops across Syria on human rights, demo-
cratic values and the potential of pluralism. 
As the insurgency spread and the number 
of casualties and displaced persons increas-
ed, the same activists also helped deliver 
medical and humanitarian aid to citizens. 
These activities were carried out at high 
risk. Activists were among the first victims 
of arrests and, in many instances, faced 
death by torture at the hands of the regime. 
When the Free Syrian Army (FSA) together 
with allied rebel militias gained control 
over parts of the country in 2012, civil activ-
ism flourished. The prospect of being able 
to work without fear of arrest encouraged 
activists to set up a large variety of often 
non-formalised civil society groups (CSGs) 
in rebel-held areas. With the transition from 
grassroots movements to organised groups, 
many groups also set up headquarters 
in neighbouring countries. In September 
2015, the Syrian NGO “Citizens for Syria” 
listed more than 800 Syrian civil-society 
groups active within Syria and outside it. 
Civil Governance in a Militarised 
Context 
Since 2012, residents in areas no longer 
controlled by the regime have set up hun-
dreds of Local Councils (LCs) similar to the 
Local Coordination Committees, often in 
cooperation with them and local civil-
society groups. They ensure administrative 
services and manage the affairs of their 
communities in the absence of state institu-
tions. This model was soon adopted by the 
Syrian National Council (SNC), the biggest 
and most significant Syrian opposition 
grouping in exile and the main interlocutor 
for external support to the opposition. LCs 
were to work like “small governments”, 
coordinating with development and service 
institutions to lessen the chaos of war and 
provide support to citizens. They were also 
intended to become the nucleus of future 
municipalities in a transitional government 
and ultimately assist in the formation of an 
elected government. 
The councils’ degree of legitimacy on the 
ground varies considerably. While some, 
such as the Aleppo Local City Council, were 
established through semi-democratic elec-
tions, the majority are formed by consensus 
or nomination of local figures on good 
terms with notables, tribes and influential 
families. With the continuous shrinking of 
opposition-held territories, the number of 
Local Councils has fallen from around 800 
in the first quarter of 2015 to an estimated 
395 active LCs in March 2016, most of them 
in the Aleppo and Idlib governorates. It has 
been declining since. 
Dependence on External Funding 
A key challenge for Local Councils has been 
funding, as donor policies towards Syrian 
non-state actors over the past six years have 
been erratic and non-coordinated. LCs and 
CSGs alike suffer from the absence of long-
term and coordinated strategies. When the 
first LCs were established in early 2012, 
wealthy Syrian expatriates as well as some 
European governments supported them 
financially. However, with the creation of 
the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution 
and Opposition Forces, which replaced the 
SNC in November 2012, many countries 
decided to channel their funds through the 
Coalition to strengthen its legitimacy. 
Since 2013, the Syrian Interim Govern-
ment (SIG), an administrative body attached 
to the Coalition, has sought to exert control 
over Local Councils and streamline their 
funding mechanisms. But the SIG itself ran 
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out of money and backing due to internal 
conflict and uncoordinated donor policies. 
Technical and financial support for LCs 
through the Coalition has therefore been 
much less than expected. Funding for aid 
and services remains too low, and council 
members are usually not paid a regular 
living wage. This presents a major obstacle 
to the effectiveness and professionalism of 
LCs. 
Civil-society groups are in a similar situa-
tion. With few exceptions, funding is in-
sufficient and, even more problematically, 
it is mostly project-based and therefore un-
sustainable in the long run. Many groups 
do not have access to international fund-
ing, not least because of language barriers. 
Those with direct access to donors through 
their headquarters in neighbouring coun-
tries or Europe are in a better position to 
employ qualified personnel and apply for 
project funds. While many Syrian CSGs 
direct their work into Syria, the tight con-
trol and even closing of Syrian borders 
has made cooperation very difficult and 
widened the gap between those working 
inside and outside the country. 
Relations with Armed Groups 
The efficiency of local civil actors depends 
largely on the local power balance and the 
military groups active in their area. At first, 
armed groups under the FSA umbrella en-
couraged and endorsed the creation of LCs. 
In many places, council members (usually 
civilians) and fighters shared similar social 
backgrounds, which facilitated a harmoni-
ous relationship. FSA brigades have gener-
ally not attempted to take control of LCs by 
force. 
However, Islamist armed groups – such 
as Ahrar al-Sham, the al-Qaeda linked 
Jabhat al-Nusra (re-branded Jabhat Fath 
al-Sham in summer 2016) – have started to 
develop their own administrative struc-
tures. These too aspire to being municipal 
administrations, and are hence in direct 
competition with LCs. 
Armed groups and their charitable 
branches, financially backed by Gulf States, 
are often better equipped to tackle the 
needs of impoverished local communities. 
Furthermore, LCs have a certain authority 
over civilians, though not over combatants 
in armed groups. Thus, in Kafranbel, the 
stronghold of civil engagement in Idlib 
governorate, Jabhat Fath al-Sham keeps 
intimidating civil actors who stand up for 
civil rights. These factors have significantly 
weakened the LCs and encouraged the 
spread of administrative chaos. The take-
over of some areas by IS has further under-
mined the work of both LCs and CSGs. 
Many had to relocate internally or seek 
refuge across the border in Turkey. By con-
trast, in areas where LCs are relatively safe– 
such as regions near the Jordanian border 
under FSA control – they have been able to 
mediate between armed groups and civil-
ians. Often they are the only structure 
capable of bringing together local power 
players, organising the implementation 
of agreements or coordinating protective 
measures for local communities. 
Conflict and Cooperation among Civil 
Actors 
Although the establishment of Local Coun-
cils was in many cases closely coordinated 
with local activists, their institutionalisa-
tion under the SNC umbrella, and later the 
Syrian Interim Government, initially fos-
tered a feeling of mistrust towards them. 
This was compounded by the lack of trans-
parent and democratic elections. Few civil 
society groups inside Syria were willing to 
cooperate with LCs, which in their eyes had 
lost their legitimacy as local structures. 
Since 2014, however, new dynamics of co-
operation have emerged. The dwindling of 
financial and human resources and the in-
creasing military pressure along with the 
failure of the Interim Government to deliv-
er aid has produced a rapprochement be-
tween the local civil actors operating on the 
ground. 
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Targeting Symbols of Civil Activity 
Since 2012, the Syrian regime has deliber-
ately targeted and besieged areas in which 
local civil actors were considered particu-
larly successful. In November 2016, accord-
ing to the UN, more than 900,000 people 
were living under siege. When the largest 
besieged area, Eastern Aleppo, was retaken 
by the regime in mid-December 2016, a sec-
ond symbol of successful civil engagement 
was destroyed by the regime’s brute force. 
The first such symbol was the Damascus 
suburb of Daraya, which had been under 
the control of local rebels since 2012. Here, 
despite enormous challenges, the Local 
Council had succeeded in establishing 
offices and providing services to civilians. 
After four years of siege and heavy bom-
bardment by government forces, a deal to 
evacuate and relocate all civilians and rebel 
fighters to Idlib and other parts of Syria was 
reached in August 2016. The emptying of 
Daraya marked the end of a remarkable ex-
perience of non-violent resistance and self-
organisation, which inspired many civil-
society activists throughout the country. It 
was followed by the surrender of its neigh-
bouring city Moadamiyeh and the suburbs 
Qudsaya and al-Hameh in October as well as 
Khan Eshieh, Zakiya and al-Tall in Novem-
ber and December 2016. Some inhabitants, 
including local council members and activ-
ists, were forced to transfer to Idlib gover-
norate along with the rebel fighters. 
The fall of Aleppo to the regime marks 
the end of one of the largest concentrations 
of civil-society engagement anywhere in the 
country, including dozens of free media 
outlets, and emergency and relief organi-
sations. Aleppo’s Local City Council had 
managed to replace basic state services 
since 2012. The intentional targeting of 
civil facilities of all kinds in rebel-held areas 
reveals the extent to which the regime has 
seen attempts to replace state institutions 
as a major threat to its legitimacy. Their 
representatives face the most severe con-
sequences wherever the regime regains 
control, and it is hard to imagine indepen-
dent civil activism continuing to exist. 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
The survival of Syrian civil actors is crucial. 
In the short-term, their local structures are 
vital for effectively distributing humanitar-
ian aid and services to communities in non-
government controlled areas. Only if local 
civil actors have the means and capacity to 
provide services can they present an alter-
native to Islamist groups. Moreover, local 
civil actors can serve as role models through 
their daily activities, indirectly promoting 
social cohesion and preparing the ground 
for future peace-building by working on 
education and human rights. With the in-
creasing scarcity of resources, the media-
tion role of councils and civil-society groups 
will also become even more central. 
Even if an immediate political agree-
ment is unlikely, in the long term any deal 
will have to be implemented on the ground. 
Local civil actors are predestined to play a 
key role through their networks, adminis-
trative structures and personal relation-
ships. This would be of particular impor-
tance in case the regime would make con-
cessions in favour of a decentralised system. 
However, if international support to civil 
actors in Syria and in exile is not continu-
ous and long-term, this potential is lost. 
Financial support should not only be pro-
ject-oriented, but also provide the resources 
civil actors need to plan more effectively, 
strategically and sustainably. Capacity-
building measures need to include institu-
tional-management skills. Moreover, as 
many Syrian civil activists in Lebanon, Jor-
dan and Turkey do not obtain work permits 
and are unable to open bank accounts or 
register as NGOs, donor agencies should 
explore ways of solving these restrictions. 
Ultimately, however, nothing would be 
more effective than preventing the military 
strangling of Syria’s cities and towns. If the 
current onslaught and large-scale destruc-
tion do not stop, no amount of external 
funding and support will be able to save 
Syria’s local civil actors. 
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